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Abstract
There are many examples of human decision mak-
ing which cannot be modeled by classical proba-
bilistic and logic models, on which the current AI
systems are based. Hence the need for a modeling
framework which can enable intelligent systems to
detect and predict cognitive biases in human deci-
sions to facilitate better human-agent interaction.
We give a few examples of irrational behavior and
use a generalized probabilistic model inspired by
the mathematical framework of Quantum Theory
to model and explain such behavior.
1 Introduction
Decades of research by cognitive scientists have shown
that in some cases human judgment under uncer-
tainty violates the classical(Bayesian) Probability the-
ory and other logic models [Kahneman et al., 1982;
Tversky and Shafir, 1992]. In a famous experiment, [Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983] presented participants with the fol-
lowing text:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright.
She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply
concerned with the issues of discrimination and social justice,
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is
more probable: (a) Linda is a bank teller (b) Linda is active in
the feminist movement and is a bank teller
The participants consistently rated the probability of
event (b) as more than that of (a). This violates the axioms
of probability theory, according to which the probability of
conjunction of two events is always less than that of any
of the single events. In the set theoretical formalism of
probability, of the sample space of all possible Lindas who
are Bank Tellers, only a subset of it will be both Bank Teller
and Feminist.
These findings, termed as the Conjunction Fallacy, have
been investigated a lot since then [Sides et al., 2002]. Ex-
periments have been conducted with various kinds of stories,
even using words like ”betting” instead of ”Probability”, in-
dicating that this judgment error is not due to ignorance or
misunderstanding of the concept of Probability. There is also
another example of similar behavior called the Disjunction
Fallacy, where humans rate the probability of disjunction as
less than that of individual events. It is concluded that the
classical probability Theory cannot explain such judgments.
Another paradoxical finding from the works of Tversky is
that similarity judgments by humans violate metric axioms.
In some cases, the similarity of A and B is not the same as
similarity of B and A. As an example, the similarity of Ko-
rea(North Korea) to China was judged greater than the sim-
ilarity of China to Korea [Tversky, 1977]. The explanation
proposed by Tversky was that most of the features associ-
ated with Korea are similar to China. So Korea appears more
similar to China. However, China has many other features as-
sociated with it. One has more knowledge about China than
Korea, while judging Sim(China, Korea). Therefore it does
not appear as similar as Sim(Korea, China). Similarity be-
tween two objects is a function of distance between points
in a multidimensional space, the objects being represented
by the points. Thus it should not depend upon the order in
which the objects are considered. So this is another instance
where human decision making does not conform to the exist-
ing methods of modeling.
Different explanations and models have been proposed
for the judgment fallacies described above [Tversky and
Kahneman, 1983; Tversky, 1977; Nosofsky, 1984; 1991;
Krumhansl, 1978; 1988; Ashby and Perrin, 1988]. We now
present a generalized probabilistic model which can incorpo-
rate and explain the above judgment fallacies.
2 Quantum Probabilistic Modeling
Quantum Theory was developed to explain the counter-
intuitive behavior of microscopic particles, which could not
be modeled using standard probability theories. It was
axiomatically organized by von Neumann [von Neumann,
1955], which enables it to be used as an abstract mathematical
framework independent of Physics. In the standard probabil-
ity theory, events are defined as subsets of a sample space
of all possible events. In the Quantum logic framework, the
sample space is a finite or infinite dimensional Hilbert space,
which is an abstract Vector Space with inner products. Each
event is represented as a subspace of the Hilbert space. For
example, consider the event ”Linda is active in the feminist
movement”. In a two dimensional Hilbert space, let F be the
vector(a one dimensional subspace) denoting this event. We
(a) Figure 1.a (b) Figure 1.b (c) Figure 1.c (d) Figure 1.d
rather denote it as |F 〉, to be consistent with the Dirac no-
tation of Quantum Theory. The negation of this event, that
Linda is not active in the feminist movement is given by an
orthogonal vector, denoted as
∣∣∣F˜〉. Together, these two vec-
tors span the two dimensional Hilbert space, thus forming an
orthogonal basis. We have another event ”Linda is a bank
teller”, |B〉. Now this event is not mutually exclusive to |F 〉
or
∣∣∣F˜〉, nor is same as them. So we denote it in the same
Hilbert space as a separate vector. |B〉 and
∣∣∣B˜〉 form another
orthonormal basis of the Hilbert space. The Quantum equiv-
alent of the probability distribution function - which assigns
classical probabilities to each event, is an abstract state vec-
tor. The probability of an event is calculated by projecting
the state vector onto the event subspace and taking the square
of the projection obtained. The closer an event subspace is
to the state vector, the larger the projection, and hence larger
the probability. The essential difference between Quantum
and classical probabilities lies in the concept of incompati-
ble events. It is not possible to specify a joint probability
distribution for incompatible events. Being certain about the
outcome of one event induces an uncertain state regarding the
outcomes of other events. In terms of cognition, incompati-
ble events means that a cognitive agent cannot think about
two events at the same time, thus assesses them one after the
other. Incompatibility induces a sequence of judgments, in-
stead of a joint distribution. For compatible events, the Quan-
tum framework gives the same results as the classical one.
For the Quantum probabilistic modeling of the Conjunction
Fallacy [Busemeyer et al., 2011], consider the Hilbert space
in Figure 1. The state vector |ψ〉 represents user’s cognitive
state prior to evaluating the two questions posed about Linda
in the previous section. Note that |ψ〉 is closer to |F 〉 and al-
most orthogonal to |B〉, indicating that for the user, the prob-
ability that Linda is a feminist is high and that Linda is a bank
teller(option (a) in the problem described above) is low. As
the two events described in option (b) are represented as in-
compatible, the user cannot consider their joint probability
and evaluates them sequentially. We, therefore, first project
the state |ψ〉 onto |F 〉 and then onto |B〉(Figure 1.b). This
final projection is larger than the direct projection from |ψ〉 to
|B〉(Figure 1.b). For this alignment of vectors, the Quantum
model explains the Conjunction Fallacy.
For the explanation of asymmetry in similarity judgment,
[Pothos and Busemeyer, 2011] propose to model the dis-
tinct features of concepts as different subspaces. So con-
cepts with higher number of features are represented as sub-
spaces of higher dimensionality. Consider a simplified exam-
ple of a three dimensional Hilbert space where the concept
China is associated with a two dimensional subspace, and
Korea is associated with a one-dimensional subspace. The
initial cognitive state |ψ〉 is uniformly suspended between the
two subspaces. For Sim(Korea, China), it is first projected
onto the subspace for Korea and then onto the subspace for
China(Figure 2.a) The order of projections is reversed for
Sim(China, Korea). As can be seen(Figure 2.b), the final
projection(Projection 2) is larger in the case of Sim(Korea,
China). The geometrical reason behind this is that for the
Sim(Korea, China) case, the last projection is to a higher di-
mensional subspace, which preserves a larger portion of the
vector than a projection to a lower dimensional subspace.
This also intuitively explains the fact that since China has
more features than Korea, it is easier to think of those fea-
tures which are similar to Korea(form of government, etc.),
when evaluating Sim(Korea, China).
3 Conclusion and Future Work
We showed some examples of human judgments which ap-
pear inexplicable by classical probability theories. Quantum
theory provides a generalized, geometric theory of probabil-
ity which provides parameter free modeling of many of such
examples. It also incorporates the classical probability the-
ory as a special case, where all events are compatible with
each other. The Quantum framework is being increasingly
applied to cognitive science under the field of Quantum Cog-
nition [Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012]. From the systems side,
it is being applied to Information Retrieval and Natural Lan-
guage Processing [Rijsbergen, 2004; Sordoni et al., 2013;
Bruza et al., 2011; Aerts et al., 2018]. The enigmatic Quan-
tum principles of Superposition, Interference, Entanglement
and Contextuality are being investigated and applied in all of
these areas. What we propose in this paper is the need to en-
hance the capabilities of AI agents by modeling them using
the Quantum Probabilistic framework. This will enable them
to detect and predict irrational behavior, thus enabling them
think more like humans. Not only that, according to [Bruza
and Hoenkamp, 2018] this will help humans put more trust
in the autonomous systems. The first step would be to iden-
tify cases where irrational human behavior occurs and model
them using Quantum Probability.
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